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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

SALT LAKE COMMUNITY COLLEGE,
Petitioner,
Case No.

930374-CA

vs.
Priority 7
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF
UTAH and PAUL T. KIRBY,
Respondents.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
PAUL T. KIRBY

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Respondent Paul T. Kirby ("Kirby") concurs with Petitioner's
Statement of Jurisdiction.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
ISSUES
1.

Kirby adopts by reference the portions of the Brief of

the Respondent Industrial Commissioner of Utah ("the Industrial
Commission") which concern Issue One, to wit: Whether the January
22,

1993 Determination

and Order

issued by the Utah Anti-

Discrimination Division ("UADD") is invalid because it was not
signed by Anna Jensen.

1

2.

Kirby does not concur with Petitioner Salt Lake Community

College's

("the

College") statement of the issues on review.

Properly, the issues on review are as follows:
a.

Whether the Industrial Commission abused its discretion

when it failed to grant an extension to the College to file
its Request for an Evidentiary Hearing ("Request").
b.

Whether, absent a good cause showing, the Industrial

Commission

had

jurisdiction

to

grant

a

review

of

its

Determination and Order since the Request was received by the
Industrial Commission more than thirty days after it issued
its Determination and Order.
c.

Whether it was error for the Administrative Law Judge

("ALJ") to issue his decision that the College's Request
untimely before the College replied to Kirby's Motion to
Strike,
d.

If it was error for the ALJ to issue his decision that

the College's Request was untimely, whether that error was
harmless.
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Kirby adopts by reference the portions of the Industrial
Commission's Brief which concern Issue One.
With respect to Issue Two, subparagraphs
should

be

reviewed

under

Utah

Code

Ann.

(a) (b) and (c)
Section

63-46b-

16(4)(h)(iv), which provides that the appellate court can grant
relief if the agency action is arbitrary or capricious, and the

2

court employs the reasonableness standard. Maverick Country Stores
v. The Industrial Commission, 860 P.2d 944, 950 (Utah App. 1993).
Subparagraph (d) should be reviewed to determine whether, even
if there was error, the College was "substantially prejudiced" by
the action of the ALJ, or whether such error was harmless.

Utah

Code Ann. Section 63-46b-4. Morton International, Inc. v. Auditing
Division, 814 P.2d 581, 584 (Utah 1991).
DETERMINATIVE OR IMPORTANT PROVISIONS
Kirby has set forth in the body of his Brief the relevant
statutory provisions.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Kirby concurs in the College's Statement of the Case.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Kirby does not agree with many of the so-called "facts"
set forth by the College. The Court is not considering the merits
of this action, but only the timeliness of Appellant's Request.
Nevertheless, the College has inserted "facts" not relevant to the
matters on appeal in order to attempt to convince the Court that
a terrible miscarriage of justice will occur if it does not find
a way to permit the College to wiggle out of its obligations under
the Commission's Order.
Kirby agrees that this is a case of reverse discrimination.
Kirby had been employed by the College on a part-time, adjunct
basis, teaching Spanish.

When a full-time, permanent faculty

3

position was advertised, he applied for the job.
qualified.

He was fully

The position was awarded to a Hispanic woman, who did

not possess the minimum qualifications for the position.
Kirby filed a claim with the UADD, stating he was a victim of
sex, race and religious discrimination and retaliation.

After a

through investigation, the UADD issued a Determination and Order
finding that he had suffered sexual and racial discrimination on
January 22, 1993. The College did not request an extension of time
to request an evidentiary hearing.

The College did not request a

review of that Determination and Order until February 23, 1993, one
day after the statutory thirty-day period had run. The ALJ denied
the College's Request because it was untimely.

Thereafter, the

College filed two timely motions for review with the Industrial
Commission, both of which were denied.

It then filed a timely

notice of appeal.
However, the College has misled the Court in several areas in
its Statement of Facts.

The College claims that Kirby was ranked

eleventh among the applicants for the faculty position in Spanish.
It doesn't mention that all the ranking sheets, which the College
is required by affirmation action regulations to maintain, have
disappeared.

Therefore, there is no factual basis for this

ranking.
The College claims that the sole reason why it found for Kirby
was that the successful applicant had not completed her masters
degree

by

July

1992.

In

fact,

the

Industrial

articulated three reasons for its Determination.
4

Commission

The College had set forth three qualifications for the faculty
position in Spanish, to wit:
1.

M.S. or M.A. degree in Spanish or closely related field.

2.
Teaching experience, with preference to those with
demonstrated strength in community college teaching.
3.
Non-teaching related work experience.
Appellants Brief, R.76.

Addendum G to

It is undisputed that the successful applicant, Laura GaonaBradford, had not received her masters degree before she was
selected

for the position.

Although the College claims she

received that degree by September 1992, and suggests there is proof
of that fact on the record, it is untrue.

There is no proof that

she had received that degree by the time her employment began in
September 1992. The fact is, she did not receive the degree in or
before September 1992.
Further, the College states that the sole basis for the
Determination of discrimination was an assumption (which it claims
was inaccurate) that the successful applicant had to have a masters
degree by July 1992. In fact, the Determination states that Kirby
was the more qualified candidate for numerous reasons.

First, he

had already obtained a masters degree, while Ms. Gaona-Bradford had
not. Further, Kirby had demonstrated strength in community college
teaching,

while Ms. Gaona-Bradford

teaching experience at all.

had

no

community

college

Finally, the Industrial Commission

found Kirby had more college level teaching experience, and more
general work experience than Ms. Gaona-Bradford.

5

The merits of

Kirby's claim are far stronger than the College would have the
Court believe.
The most

serious misstatement

of fact the College made

concerns the position the ALJ took in his Order denying the
College's Motion for Review.

The College stated

The Commission concluded that the general UAPA provision
allowing for an extension of time periods for good cause,
Utah Code Ann. Section 63-46b-l(9) (Supp. 1993), did not
apply to UADD proceedings and thus, no extension of time
for requesting a formal evidentiary hearing was available
to the College for "good cause." Appellant's Brief at
6, citing to R. 615.
In fact, the ALJ specifically found that Utah Code Ann.
Section 63-46b-l(9) did apply, and did not accept Kirby's argument
that it should not apply in this case.

Addendum E to Appellant's

Brief, R. 615. However, the ALJ found that
The Respondent failed to timely request an extension of
time in which to file, or timely file its motion for
review.
Addendum E to Appellant's Brief, R. 616,
emphasis added.
With the exception of these corrections, Kirby accepts the
College's Statement of Facts.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Because the College did not request an extension of time
within which to file its Request for Review before the thirty day
period established in both Utah Code Ann. Sections 34-35-7.1(5)(c)
and 63-46b-12, and in Utah Administrative Code R560-1-4A(3) , the
Industrial Commission was without jurisdiction to extend the time
to file a Request, even if there were "good cause" to do so.
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However,

even

assuming

the

Industrial

Commission

had

jurisdiction after thirty days to extend the thirty-day period,
the College failed to request such an extension.
Assuming that the College's Respond to Complainant's Motion
to Strike and the Affidavit of J. Clark Whitehead, attached thereto
as Addenda 1 and 2, filed March 11, 1993, after the ALJ's Order of
Dismissal was filed, were sufficient to request an extension of the
thirty-day period and were timely, the ALJ did not abuse his
discretion in denying the extension of time. As a matter of fact
and law, the excuse set forth by the College, to wit:

that the

internal procedure for filing a request could not be completed by
closing time on February 22, 1992, is not "good cause."
With respect to the issue of the College's lack of opportunity
to respond to Kirby's Motion to Strike its Request for lack of
timeliness, the ALJ made no error in failing to wait for the
College's response. There is no evidence on the record that the ALJ
even considered Kirby's Motion.

The ALJ made its decision based

solely on the lack of timeliness of the Request from the College.
However, even if it were error for the ALJ to rule before the
College had an opportunity to reply to Kirby's Motion, that error
was harmless. The Industrial Commission lacked jurisdiction after
the thirty days had passed to rule on the merits of the case.
Further, the arguments set forth in the College's Response were
inadequate to justify such an extension.

Finally, those same

arguments were submitted by the College in its Motion for Review
and its Motion for Reconsideration, and were rejected twice by the
7

ALT.

There is no reason to believe they would have been accepted

the first time around, had they been considered.
ARGUMENT
I.
KIRBY INCORPORATES BY REFERENCE THE RESPONSE OF THE
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION TO THE COLLEGE'S ARGUMENTS SET FORTH IN
POINT I OF THE BRIEF SUBMITTED BY THE COLLEGE.
II. AS A RESULT OF THE FAILURE OF THE COLLEGE TO SEEK AN
EXTENSION OF THE THIRTY-DAY TIME PERIOD FOR FILING A REQUEST
FOR REVIEW BEFORE THAT PERIOD RAN, THE DETERMINATION AND ORDER
OF THE COMMISSION IS A FINAL ORDER.
The College claims that the Commission, through the ALJ,
determined that the "good cause" extension period in Utah Code Ann.
Section 63-46b-l(9) does not apply to the cases decided by the
UADD.
Section

In fact, the ALJ specifically found that Utah Code Ann.
63-46b-l(9) did apply.

That

statute provides that,

"nothing restricts a presiding officer, for good cause shown, from
lengthening...any time period prescribed in this chapter, except
those time periods prescribed

for judicial review."

(Emphasis

added.)
What the Industrial Commission actually determined in this
case is that it was without jurisdiction to proceed, once the
thirty-day period within which a Request must be filed had passed.
Utah Code Ann. Section 34-35-7.1(5)(c) and Administrative Rule
R560-1-4(A) (2) and (3) all provide that unless the Request is filed
within thirty days of the issuance of the Determination and Order,
that Order is final. Once the Order is final, there are no further
rights of review or appeal within the Commission.
Section 34-35-7.1(5)(d).
8

Utah Code Ann.

The College cites Maverick Country Stores, Inc. v, Industrial
Commission, supra in support of its claim that the extension of
time is available to it.

Kirby does not dispute the finding in

that case that a "good cause" extension is potentially available
to an employer who wishes to have an evidentiary hearing on the
Industrial Commission's initial Determination and Order. However,
the Court in Maverick held that
..., absent a showing of good cause for an extension,
the term filing as used in section 63-46b-12 requires,
as a prerequisite to the agency taking jurisdiction over
a review, actual delivery of the necessary documents to
the agency within the thirty day time limit. (Maverick
Country Stores, Inc. v. Industrial Commission, supra at
950. (Emphasis added.)
In this case, it is undisputed that the College failed to
deliver either a Request for Review or for an extension of time
until after the thirty-day deadline.

Therefore, the Industrial

Commission had no jurisdiction to consider the review.
The College claims it requested an extension of time within
which to file its Request for Review in its Response to Kirby's
Motion to Strike.

However, that Response was not filed until

several weeks after the thirty-day deadline to seek an evidentiary
hearing had passed.

Indeed, the Industrial Commission had issued

its Order of Dismissal, denying the Request of the College for a
review on the grounds that the Request was untimely, before the
College requested an extension.
In fact, the College actually argued that the Industrial
Commission abused its discretion in failing to grant it a one-day
extension of time, without a timely request that it do so.
9

This

is exactly the situation the Court faced in Maverick.

There the

employer failed to timely request an extension of the thirty-day
period, and the Court found no abuse of discretion when the
Industrial Commission failed to grant the extension.
The College claims that Harper Investments, Inc. v. Utah State
Tax Commission,

231 Utah Ad.Rep. 3 (Utah 1994) supports its

position, in that the Utah Supreme Court implicitly rejected the
Commission's view that it is deprived of jurisdiction once the
thirty-day period has expired.

Kirby concedes that the Tax

Commission granted an extension of time to file a Motion to
Reconsider after the time to file the Motion had passed. However,
the Tax Commission had failed to send notice of its decision to the
parties affected by its decision.

More importantly, neither the

Tax Commission nor appellants raised the issue of propriety of that
extension, and therefore the matter was not before the Court.
The College argues that Rule 4(e) and Rule 48(e) of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure support its claim that a request for
an extension of time may be filed after the original thirty-day
time period. However, both of those rules explicitly provide that
such an extension may be sought after the initial thirty-day
period, so long as the request is made within thirty days of the
date the original thirty-day deadline has run.

There is no such

extra time provided in Utah Code Ann. Section 63-46b-l(9) to
request an extension.
The College argues that the Court should follow the standards
established for Rules 4(e) and 48(e) of the Rules of Appellate
10

Procedure for "good cause" extensions of time.

The College cited

State v. Price, 837 P.2d 578 (Utah App. 1992) in support of that
position. However, that case held that, when a criminal Defendant
is informed of a thirty-day time period within which to withdraw
his guilty plea, and attempts to withdraw it after the thirty-day
period, the withdrawal is untimely. The matter is jurisdictional.
However

unfair

withdrawal.

it may

appear,

the

Court

cannot

permit

the

Only if the Defendant had requested an extension

within thirty days after his initial thirty-day deadline expired
would it have been possible for him to withdraw his plea.

State

v. Price, supra at 583.
Similarly, in this case the College was informed in the
initial Order of January 22, 1993, that it must file a written
request for a formal hearing within thirty days from the issuance
of the Order and told that if no timely request is received, the
Order would become a final Order with no further rights of appeal.
(R. 549-550.)
However, Utah Code Ann. Section 63-46b-l(9) does not provide
for any grace period to request an extension.

Therefore, the

provisions of Utah Code Ann. Section 34-35-7.1(5) (d) govern, there
being no relevant provision of the UAPA which would supercede the
UADD statutory scheme.

Utah Code Ann. Section 34-35-7.1(5)(d)

provides
If the director receives no timely request for a hearing,
the determination and order issued by the director...
becomes the final order of the commission.
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Such final orders are subject only to judicial review.

(Utah Code

Ann. Section 63-46b-14.)
III. EVEN ASSUMING THAT A REQUEST FOR EXTENSION IS VALID IF
FILED AFTER THE THIRTY-DAY PERIOD, THE COLLEGE FAILED TO FILE
ALLEGE SUFFICIENT FACTS TO DEMONSTRATE "GOOD CAUSE."
Although the College claims on page 18 of its Brief that it
requested a good cause extension of the thirty-day time period,
there is no evidence of that request on the record.

The only

documents in the record in which the College asked for such an
extension are the College's Response to Kirby's Motion to Strike
and the Affidavit of J.Clark Whitehead, the Director of Personnel
Services at the College.
In the Response, the College stated
In this case, the College policy requires an internal
review of the response by the College administration
before filing. The person in charge did everything in
his power to expedite the review, but could not finalize
that review because of circumstances beyond his control.
(Addendum 1.)
Mr. Whitehead stated essentially the same facts in his Affidavit.
Even assuming that these statements in pleadings on another
issue are sufficient to request an extension of time to file a
Request for Review, and assuming that a request is timely if made
after the Industrial Commission had dismissed the Request for
Review because it was untimely, the request for an extension could
not be granted.
Kirby could find no cases which define "good cause" as used
in Utah Code Ann. Section 63-46b-l(9).

However, as the College

pointed out, the Rule 4(e) and 48(e) of the Rules of Appellate
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Procedure are analogous to Utah Code Ann. Section 63-46-1(9). The
Courts have uniformly interpreted the time period in those rules
to be jurisdictional, and a failure to timely appeal or request an
extension renders the appellate courts without jurisdiction. See,
for example, State v. Price, supra; State v. Palmer, 777 P.2d 521
(Utah App. 1989); Prowswood, Inc. v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 676
P.2d 952 (Utah 1984) .
In interpreting the Appellate Rules, the Court refused to find
"good cause" when a prisoner, who could not personally deliver an
appeal to the trial court, mailed the notice of appeal from prison
three days before the deadline, but the trial court did not receive
the notice until over three weeks later.

Although the Court in

Prowswood was construing earlier Court rules, which provided for
an "excusable neglect" standard, rather than "good cause", its
findings and holding are instructive.

It wrote

When the question of "excusable neglect" arise in
a jurisdictional context..., the standard contemplated
thereby is necessarily a strict one. Prowswood, Inc. v.
Mountain Fuel Supply Co., supra at 959.
It cited with approval an instance when a court refused to grant
an extension of time when the senior litigator responsible for the
case had died.

Prowswood, Inc. v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., supra

at 960.
Similarly, in this case, the fact that the College failed to
complete

its internal

review of the response

asking

for an

evidentiary hearing in a timely manner is hardly "good cause."
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The Court

in Prowswood particularly

emphasized

that the

prejudice to the person seeking the extension of time has, and
should have, no impact on the determination of whether or not
excusable neglect existed.

Id.

Similarly, the prejudice to the

College if it is bound by the Commission's Order is irrelevant to
a determination of whether "good cause" existed to grant an
extension of time.
Utah Code Ann. Section

63-46b-16(4), which governs this

appeal, provides
The appellate court shall grant relief only if,...it
determines that a person seeking judicial review has been
substantially prejudiced....(emphasis added.)
The Utah Supreme Court, in Morton International, Inc. v. Auditing
Division, supra at 586, held that the legislature intended the
courts to use the same standard as "harmless error", which is error
"sufficiently

inconsequential

that...there

is

no

reasonable

likelihood that the error affect the outcome of the proceedings."
In this case, even if the College had made a timely request
for an extension of time to file its Request for Review, it has
not been substantially prejudiced by the AU's failure to consider
its request for an extension of time.

It has not set forth facts

sufficient to demonstrate the "good cause" necessary to justify an
extension of time to file the Request.
IV. IF THE ALJ ERRED IN RULING BEFORE THE COLLEGE RESPONDED
TO KIRBY'S MOTION TO STRIKE, THAT ERROR WAS UTTERLY HARMLESS.
The

College

claims

that

somehow

it

was

"substantially

prejudiced" by the AU's ruling on the timeliness of its Request
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for Review before it had responded to Kirby's Motion to Strike on
the grounds that the Request for Review was untimely.
There is nothing on the record that demonstrates that Kirby's
Motion influenced the ALJ at all. He did not grant Kirby's Motion
to Strike. Rather, he merely held that the College "failed to file
its request for de novo review within 30 days of the date of the
order."
Further, for the reasons set forth above in Sections II and
III of this Brief, the College's request for an extension of time
was itself untimely, or insufficient.

Therefore, the failure of

the ALJ to consider the College's arguments in its Response to
Kirby's Motion to Strike are utterly harmless. The ALJ could have
made no other decision than that the Request was untimely.
Finally, the College made precisely the same arguments in its
Motion for Review of the Order of Dismissal and its Motion for
Reconsideration as those set forth in its Response.

They were

rejected twice. There is absolutely no reason to assume that they
would have been more persuasive before the ALJ ruled that the
Request for Review was denied because it was untimely.
In fact, if Kirby had not filed his Motion, pointing out that
the Request for Review was untimely, the College would not have
realized its mistake until after its Request had been denied.

It

is clear that the College believed that the filing deadline had
been met. The College was not harmed by the timing of the decision
of the ALJ to deny its Request for an evidentiary hearing.

15

CONCLUSION
For

the

reasons

set

forth

above,

the

judgment

of the

Industrial Commission should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted this 1st day of April, 1994.

Lou;
Attorney for PauS T. Kirby
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies gf the^bove
and foregoing was hand-delivered on the / *vf- day of,
1994, to the following:
Alan Hennebold
The Industrial Commission of Utah
160 East 300 South, 3rd Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
L.A. Dever
Deputy Solicitor General
2 36 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
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ADDENDUM 1

JAN GRAHAM (1231)
Attorney General
JOHN S. MCALLISTER (2140)
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
Beneficial Life Tower, Suite 1100
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 533-3220

IN THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION, STATE OF UTAH
ANTI-DISCRIMINATION DIVISION

PAUL S. KIRBY,
Complainant,
-v-

RESPONSE TO COMPLAINANT'S
MOTION TO STRIKE RESPONSE OF
RESPONDENT, OR TO DENY REQUEST
FOR HEARING

SALT LAKE COMMUNITY COLLEGE,

UADD No,
EEOC No.,

92-0590
35C-92-611

Respondent.

Respondent Salt Lake Community College (hereinafter
College) through its counsel John S. McAllister, Assistant
Attorney General, hereby responds to the Complainant Paul S.
Kirby's Motion to Strike Response of Respondent, or to Deny
Request for Hearing, dated March 5, 1993, and received March 8,
1993.
As a basis for his motion Complainant argues that (1)
the College's response is untimely and (2) that the College has
not alleged additional evidence ("new facts") or given cause for
the evidence to be viewed differently.

Complainant's motion should be denied and the College's
response and request for a hearing should be allowed for the
following reasons:
1.

The original Order dated January 22, 1993, was

served by mail and was received on January 26, 1993, which
shortened the 30 day response period.

In fairness, Respondent

should have the full 30 day period to respond and request a
hearing.
2.

The 30 day period from January 22, 199 3, ended on

Sunday, February 21, 1993.

The next available day for filing was

Monday, February 22, 1993.

The College's response was hand

delivered on Tuesday February 23, 199 3, to the Director and the
original investigator.

If the response can be considered late at

all, it was only late by one day.
3.

The Director may lengthen the time period for

filing a request for review, Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-l(9).

In

this case the College policy requires an internal review of a
response by the College administration before filing.

The person

in charge did everything within his power to expedite the review,
but could not finalize that review because of circumstances
beyond his control.

The Director in fairness should lengthen the

time allowed to accept the College's request.
4.

The Director was notified verbally during the time

period that the College intended to request a hearing.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and exact copy o
the foregoing Response to Complainant's Motion to Strike Respons
of Respondent, or to Deny Request for Hearing, postage prepaid,
to the following on this the /rp-

day of March, 1993:

Louise T. Knauer
Attorney for Complainant
261 East 300 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Carlos Jimenez
Director of Diversity
Salt Lake Community College
P.O. Box 30808
Salt Lake City, Utah 84130
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ADDENDUM 2

JAN GRAHAM (1231)
Attorney General
JOHN S. MCALLISTER (2140)
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Defendant
Beneficial Life Tower, Suite 1100
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 533-3220
IN THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION, STATE OF UTAH
ANTI-DISCRIMINATION DIVISION

PAUL S. KIRBY,
Charging Party,

:
:AFFIDAVIT OF J- CLARK WHITEHEAD

vs.
SALT LAKE COMMUNITY COLLEGE,
Respondent.

UADD No, 92-0590
EEOC No. 35C-92-0611

J. Clark Whitehead having been duly sworn, hereby
states:
1.

I am the Director of Personnel Services at Salt

Lake Community College.
2.

I have the duty of handling employee relation

matters at the College and provide back-up support to the
College's Director of Diversity and Equal Opportunity who handles
discrimination complaints.

3.

I received a copy of the initial complaint in the

Paul Kirby matter from the Utah Anti-discrimination Division
(UADD).

The copy was handed to me by the Director of Diversity

and Equal Opportunity.
4.

The Director of Diversity and Equal Opportunity

kept me informed of matters surrounding the complaint and
investigation.
5.

The Director of Diversity and Equal Opportunity

proceeded to cooperate and conduct a thorough investigation of
this case, and duly reported it to UADD.
6.

The UADD investigator issued a determination of

reasonable cause resulting in an order dated January 22, 1993.
7.

The order stated that an appeal and request for a

formal hearing must be filed within 30 days from the order, or
February 21, which was a Sunday and UADD offices are not open for
filing.
8.

During the thirty days, the Director of Diversity

and Equal Opportunity had indicated verbally to the Director of
UADD intentions to file a request for a hearing.
9.

In fact a request was filed at the UADD office on

February 23, 1993.
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10.

The reason the request was not filed on February

22, 1993, was that the College has an internal procedure for
reviewing and approving the appeal.
11.

The procedure could not be completed for filing

the request by closing time on February 22, 1993, a situation
unavoidable and beyond the control of the Director of Diversity
and Equal Opportunity.
12.

The initial UADD investigation was not complete

and there is further information which calls into question the
UADD investigator's initial finding of a prima facia case.
13.

The UADD investigator relied on information that

the person selected for the position was required to obtain but
did not have a Master's degree.
14.

Based solely on the finding of the absence of a

Master's degree, the investigator concluded that the College
selection was discriminatory and made because of race and sex.
15.

The correct information is that the College policy

and practice allows a person to be selected if that person is at
the completion stage of a degree.
16.

The person selected was working toward a Master's

degree and completed the requirements as soon as possible in the
fall of 1992 as required and as advertised.
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17.

Further, the investigator overlooked a complex

higher education selection procedure which considered a field ot
over 25 applicants and ranked the person selected higher in both
the screening and interview portions of the selection.
18.

The Director of Diversity and Equal Opportunity

concluded from his investigation that the selection was based on
the relative merits of the applicants pursuant to the regular
College selection process, and not because of any illegal
discrimination.
19.

I concurred in his conclusion.

This additional information should have been

considered by the investigator, and it was not.

The decision of

the Director likely would have been different had the information
been placed before the Director before the decision was made.
20.

The investigator never did find any discriminatory

practice or incident, but rather presumed discrimination from the
sole fact that the person selected did not have the required
Master's degree.
21.

Because the person selected did in fact obtain the

required Master's degree according to College requirements, there
appears to be no reasonable basis for a presumption of
discrimination.

These facts deserve to be further heard, and if

the facts are not heard the College will be unduly and severely
prejudiced.
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I verify that the foregoing statement is true to the
best of my information and belief.
Dated this

%^

day of April, 1993.

Q /l&sJ
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J. CLARK WHITEHEAD
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4600 South fUdwood Road
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August 15.11995
STATE OF UTAH

©tfBOfif PUBLIC/ 7 , z? ,
Residing

CERTIFICATE OF FILING
I hereby certify that the original of the foregoing
Affidavit of J. Clark Whitehead was hand delivered by me
personally to the Utah Anti-discrimination Division Office on the
&

day of April, 1993LISTER
ssistant Attorney General
Counsel for Respondent
Salt Lake Community College
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING ,
I hereby certify that on this

j. in

O

day of

__, 1993, I mailed an accurate photocopy of the
foregoing Affidavit of J. Clark Whitehead to the following
address:
Louise T. Knauer
Attorney for Complainant
261 East 300 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Carlos A. Jimenez
Director of Diversity and Equal
Opportunity
Salt Lake Community College
P-0. Box 30808
Salt Lake City, Utah 84130
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